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Abstract—Common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) is an 
industry standard that can assess the vulnerability of nodes in 
traditional computer systems. The metrics computed by CVSS 
would determine critical nodes and attack paths. However, 
traditional IT security models would not fit IoT embedded 
networks due to distinct nature and unique characteristics of IoT 
systems. This paper analyses the application of CVSS for IoT 
embedded systems and proposes an improved vulnerability 
scoring system based on CVSS v3 framework. The proposed 
framework, named CVSSIoT, is applied to a realistic IT supply 
chain system and the results are compared with the actual 
vulnerabilities from the national vulnerability database. The 
comparison result validates the proposed model. CVSSIoT is not 
only effective, simple and capable of vulnerability evaluation for 
traditional IT system, but also exploits unique characteristics of 
IoT devices.  
Keywords—CVSS, IoT, vulnerability, supply chain, security. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
With the rapid emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) in 
the recent years, concerns around its security and privacy have 
surged. The organised and expensive hacking campaigns and 
their impacts to the society are regular news in today’s media. 
Cyber hacking tools and zero-day vulnerabilities have huge 
demand in cyber-criminal markets. The security vulnerabilities 
of IoT devices has attracted hackers to develop sophisticated 
tools to hack connected systems for financial and political 
gains. Some governments have even invested huge financial 
resources and efforts to breach IT security of other 
governments and individuals to fulfil their specific agendas [1]. 
In the recent years, researchers have increased efforts to devise 
techniques and security models to address these concerns.  
To this end, various IoT security modellings were 
developed, such as the common vulnerability scoring system 
(CVSS) [2], to mathematically represent the probabilities of 
vulnerabilities. Such models calculate the probability of 
vulnerabilities in data integrity, confidentiality and availability 
using various factors, such as network complexity and pre-
conditions required for a successful attack. Such a calculation 
requires a consideration of the characteristics linked to 
organisation’s nature of business and related local factors as 
well as the historical impact of the vulnerabilities. 
CVSS is a free and open industry standard for assessing the 
severity of computer system security vulnerabilities. CVSS 
assigns severity scores (ranging from 1 to 10) to vulnerabilities, 
where 1 is the least and 10 is the most severe. These severity 
scores allow the administrators to prioritize responses and 
resources to the vulnerabilities with high scores. Initially, 
CVSS version 1.0 was proposed in 2005; then, version 2.0 was 
proposed in 2007. Later, in 2015, the third version of CVSS 
was released that can provide vulnerability scoring for the 
following areas [2]:  
 Base metrics that measures attacker’s access to the 
vulnerable system, the complexity involved in 
executing the attack and the pre-conditions attached for 
a successful execution of the attack. It also indicates the 
scope and scale of the vulnerability, as well as its 
impact on confidentially, integrity and data availability. 
 Temporal metrics score the characteristics that evolve 
over the lifetime of vulnerability. 
 Environmental metrics evaluate the vulnerabilities 
based on local and environmental knowledge. 
In this paper, we firstly identify the deficiencies of CVSS 
v3. To address these deficiencies, we propose an improved 
CVSS framework using CVSS v3, named CVSSIoT. This 
framework fits both traditional IT and IoT networks. To 
analyse the proposed CVSSIoT framework, a simple but 
realistic supply chain IT system topology is selected, consisting 
of database servers, Windows and UNIX setup, identity and 
access management systems, HR, payments and other related 
web base systems, network devices, IoT sensors and client 
gadgets. To examine the security threats, these nodes were 
assigned real world vulnerabilities defined in national 
vulnerability database (NVD). The CVSS and CVSSIoT scores 
of these vulnerabilities were used to calculate link probability 
between connected nodes. The security of this supply chain 
topology was analysed using vulnerability security analyser 
(VSA) tool to identify the critical nodes and calculate the 
weakest links to target node under CVSS and CVSSIoT 
calculations. The results have confirmed that CVSSIoT assigns 
more realistic numeric weights to IoT nodes by analysing the 
unique characteristics of IoT system. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section II 
describes the related work. Section III outlines the deficiencies 
of CVSS. Section IV proposes the IoT vulnerability scoring 
system, named CVSSIoT. Section V integrates CVSS v3 with 
CVSSIoT. Section VI describes the tool used in this paper for 
security vulnerability analysis. Section VII describes the 
application of CVSSIoT to a case study. Section VIII highlights 
the results. Finally, Section IX concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK  
Many analytical cybersecurity vulnerability modellings 
make use of CVSS framework to assign accurate vulnerability 
probability to IoT devices. For example, in [3], Gallon 
conducted a detailed statistical analysis of the CVSS v2 
framework and highlighted some diversity issues in the base 
and environmental vectors of CVSS. Gallon and Bascou [4] 
further enhanced the previous study [3] and suggested 
techniques to analyse the vulnerabilities using attack graph 
theory in conjunction with CVSS v2 framework. CVSS score 
were used to quantitatively analyse the attack scenarios for a 
system and suggested mitigation techniques which are 
relatively more effective. Later, Wang et al. [5] proposed an 
improved CVSS framework by adding the host server 
information similar to the server type and operating system to 
calculate the base matrix score. They have also highlighted 
some discrepancies in CVSS framework and recommended 
improvements for the temporal vector. Ibidapo and Zavarsky 
[6] conducted a detailed mathematical analysis of CVSS v2 
environmental vector and highlighted some issues with CVSS 
v2 calculations, where in some cases it was possible to produce 
a negative value. This result contradicted CVSS v2 
documentations and based on this finding, Ibidapo and 
Zavarsky argued that some results in CVSS v2 may be 
misleading and suggested improvements in CVSS v2. 
Gao [7] suggested the use of new metrics, namely, 
‘absolute severity value’, ‘relative severity value’ and ‘security 
severity values’ to enhance the calculations in the CVSS 
framework. This addition to CVSS enabled security 
administrators to evaluate the security of whole software 
system, instead of focusing on individual vulnerability of a 
component. Later, Wang [8] proposed an improvement to 
CVSS framework by using environmental statistics. In this 
model, the vulnerability calculations are linked with dynamic 
environmental information that results in different CVSS 
values with the change of environmental information. Keramati 
et al. [9] highlighted a downside of CVSS framework, due to 
its inability to properly score multistep attack on a system, 
since CVSS is designed to score the individual vulnerability 
instead of the system as a whole. Keramati et al. suggested the 
inclusion of a security matrix to CVSS framework, which is 
calculated using attack graph theory to establish the 
relationship in various vulnerabilities in multistep attack on a 
system. 
Although the above proposals provide solutions to 
overcome CVSS shortcomings, but these have added 
complexity in CVSS scoring system and have limited its usage 
to a specific systems or environment. In addition to the added 
complexity and limitations, network topologies and nodes of 
attack graph theory need to be considered when calculating the 
CVSS score. These additions may suit particular topologies 
and may not be suitable for a range of networks, especially 
heterogeneous topologies of IoT networks due to differences in 
layers and nodes of attack graph. Also, it is not practical to pre-
calculate all possible topologies in the world. Thus, linking the 
CVSS calculation with attack graph theory may benefit 
environmental circumstances, but it will affect the universal 
usage of CVSS framework. 
In [10], Doynikova proposed methods to conduct the risk 
assessment based on the CVSS v3 score. The methods were 
able to define the risk levels, measure them and plot to 
environmental attack graph topologies. Zhang [11] proposed 
the use of conditional probability when performing the risk 
assessment based on CVSS v3. Aksu [12] defined the risk 
metrics based on CVSS v3 to calculate the risk of an IT 
system, similar to vulnerability score calculated under CVSS 
v3. The above methodologies of risk assessment were mainly 
proposed for traditional computer networks. It helps the 
administrators to better understand the risk. However, such 
methodologies were not designed targeting IoT systems, and 
hence will not work due to the unique characteristics of IoT 
networks [13]. 
In [14], Ge proposed a unique framework for automating 
security analysis of the IoT. This framework consists of data 
processing, security model generation, security visualizations, 
security analyser and security model updates phases. Using the 
framework, one can compare the severity of multiple potential 
attack paths and the effectiveness of specific device-level 
strategies deployed for different devices. This helps to 
prioritize which devices should be protected first. In the case 
study presented in [15], probabilities are assumed and 
numerical representation of a probability associated with 
devices is unexplored.  
 In [15], Ando proposed a theoretical mythology to analyse 
the risk of connected IoT cars sensors by mapping the 
vulnerability vector of CVSS v3 into a 5W-tree model (who, 
what, when, where, why). However, real-world case studies 
and detailed mathematical and experimental analyses are 
necessary before adopting such a methodology.  
III. DEFICIENCIES OF CVSS 
As explained in Section II, few works have considered the 
implementation and analysis of CVSS for IoT networks, 
because the CVSS framework has initially been designed for 
traditional IT networks. However, CVSS framework (CVSS 
v3) alone is not capable of analyzing the security 
vulnerabilities of emerging IoT systems, due to the following 
shortcomings.   
Attack vector scoring: The description and the calculation 
method of attack vector score in CVSS may not be useful for 
an IoT system. For example, the traditional definition of 
remote may not be valid for an IoT node as remote may means 
few meters away in the IoT network. IoT sensors are usually in 
outer layers of a network, so attacking an IoT is consider rather 
easier as compare to IT nodes, which are usually firewall 
protected. 
Attack complexity scoring: The topology of IoT networks 
usually differ from traditional networks. The calculation of 
attack complexities based on the traditional IT systems may not 
be suitable for IoT networks due to a variety of manufacturing 
designs and dedicated functionality of IoT devices. To attack 
an IoT system, one requires specific knowledge and 
understanding of the design; hence, the attack on IoT systems 
is considered more complex.   
Human safety: The integration of IoT with our everyday 
life means our decisions are increasingly more dependent on 
IoT as compared to traditional computer systems. IoT systems 
are being designed to take independent decisions on behalf of 
humans. Sometimes wrong decision may cause collateral 
damaged to human life. CVSS framework was designed based 
on the traditional IT systems and network models. Therefore, 
the absence of human safety measures may mislead IoT 
administrators regarding the criticality of the vulnerability. 
IV. PROPOSED IOT VULNERABILITY SCORING SYSTEM−CVSSIOT 
To address the deficiencies of CVSS framework, we have 
introduced IoT related context to CVSS metrics. The Attack 
vector (AV) and Attack Complexity vector (AC) are enhanced 
in the base and environmental metrics by redefining the “local 
(L)” and “physical (P)” definitions in the IoT context.  An 
additional vector is introduced in the base and environmental 
metrics, named Human Safety Index (HI), to factor in the 
human safety issues linked with IoT devices. These 
enhancements are proposed under the name of CVSSIoT and 
details are as below. The below proposed numeric values are 
based on lab analysis and past experience. 
A. Attack Vector for CVSSIoT 
The CVSS v3 attack vector consists of Network (N), 
Adjacent Network (A), Local (L) and Physical (P) values.  A 
new Local value (Li) is proposed for IoT devices to distinguish 
their scoring from traditional IT system definition. Similarly, a 
new physical numeric value (Pi) is proposed for the attack 
vector of CVSSIoT, to distinguish the definition of Physical 
values (P) in traditional IT systems. For CVSSIoT, the numeric 
values of attach vector are [N = 0.85, A = 0.62, L = 0.55, Li = 
0.6, P = 0.2, Pi = 0.44]. As it is rather easier to physically or 
locally access IoT devices, higher numeric weights are 
assigned to IoT devices values (Li , Pi) compared to traditional 
devices values (L, P).  
B. Attack Complexity for CVSSIoT 
The CVSS v3 attack complexity vector contains Local (L), 
and High (H) values. To distinguish the complexity difference 
between IoT and traditional IT devices, the CVSSIoT 
complexity range is refined with two additional values of Mi 
and Hi, where Mi represents medium complexity and Hi 
symbolizes high complexity to calculate the CVSS scoring of 
IoT devices. For CVSSIoT, the numeric values of attack 
complexity vector are [L = 0.77, Mi = 0.44, H = 0.44, Hi = 0.2]. 
Attacking an IoT node requires specific knowledge due to its 
heterogeneous nature; hence, compared to traditional IT 
devices, lower numeric weights are assigned to IoT devices 
values (Mi and Hi) signifying high complexity.   
C. Human safety index for CVSSIoT 
We propose the human safety index (HI) in CVSSIoT for 
IoT devices to address the human safety concern. HI consists 
of three values [Ni, Li, Hi], where Ni = 0, Li = 0.44, Hi = 0.97 
and grouped under base metric vector as mandatory. To 
integrate HI with the existing CVSS, Ni is assigned a numeric 
value of 0. Therefore, setting HI value equates to making Ni 
zero under CVSSIoT, and will ignore this factor hence it will 
have no impact on calculation. Along with Ni, Li and Hi are 
other values of HI representing low and high impact. Li is 
selected for IoT node when vulnerability may cause indirect 
threat to human safety, while Hi is selected for direct threat to 
human safety. CVSSIoT groups are listed in Table 1. Differences 
between CVSS and CVSSIoT are in bold font. 
V. INTEGRATION OF CVSS V3.0 AND CVSSIOT 
CVSSIoT is further integrated with the existing CVSS v3 to 
have a single framework that works for both traditional IT and 
IoT devices. When the integrated formula is applied to the 
traditional IT systems, the vector values remain unchanged; 
hence, CVSSIoT yields the same results as CVSS v3. However, 
when this is applied to IoT devices, IoT defined values 
(symbolled as subscript i in Table 1) are assigned to the 
calculation, yielding IoT specific scores.  
TABLE1: CVSSIOT POSSIBLE VALUES 
CVSSIoT possible values 
Metric  Metric Name Possible Values Mandatory 
B
as
e 
Attack Vector, AV  
Attack Complexity, AC  
Privileges Required, PR  
User Interaction, UI  
Scope, S  
Confidentiality, C  
Integrity, I  
Availability, A 
Human Safety Index, HI 
[N, A, L, Li, P, Pi]  
[L, Mi, H, Hi]  
[N, L, H]  
[N, R]  
[U, C]  
[H, L, N]  
[H, L, N]  
[H, L, N] 
[Ni, Li, Hi] 
yes 
T
em
p
o
ra
l 
Exploit Code Maturity, E  
Remediation Level, RL  
Report Confidence, RC 
[X, H, F, P, U]  
[X, U, W, T, O]  
[X, C, R, U] 
No 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l 
Confidentiality Req, CR  
Integrity Req, IR  
Availability Req, AR  
Modified Attack Vector, MAV  
Modified Attack Complexity, MAC  
Modified Privileges Required, MPR  
Modified User Interaction, MUI  
Modified Human Safety Index, HI 
Modified Scope, MS  
Modified Confidentiality, MC  
Modified Integrity, MI  
Modified Availability, MA 
[X, H, M, L]  
[X, H, M, L]  
[X, H, M, L]  
[X, N, A, L, Li, P, Pi]  
[X, L, Mi, H, Hi]  
[X, N, L, H]  
[X, N, R]  
[X, Ni, Li, Hi] 
[X, U, C]  
[X, N, L, H]  
[X, N, L, H]  
[X, N, L, H] 
No 
The integrated formula of our CVSSIoT is as follows. The Base 
score, that is a function of the Impact and Exploitability sub 
score equations, is defined as [2] 
if (Impact sub score <= 0)     
        Base score = 0, 
else  
        Scope Unchanged:  
Base score = (𝑀𝑖[(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦), 10]), 
        Scope Changed:  
Base score = (𝑀𝑖[1.08 × (𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦), 10]), 
end 
and the Impact sub score (ISC) is defined as 
Scope Unchanged: 𝐼𝑆𝐶 = 6.42 × 𝐼𝑆𝐶Base, 
Scope Changed: 𝐼𝑆𝐶 = 7.52 × [𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 − 0.029] − 3.25 × 
         [𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 − 0.02], 
Where 
     𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 1 − [(1 − 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛) × (1 − 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔) ×  
             (1 − 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖) × (1 − 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡HI)], 
and the exploitability sub score is  
if IoT     
      8.22 × 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟IoT × 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦IoT ×         
      𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 × 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
else       
      8.22 × 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 × 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 ×  
      𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 × 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
end                                                                                          (1) 
When calculating non-IoT node scoring, 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡HI would 
always be 0. Similarly, the non-IoT values are selected for 
exploitability calculations; hence, it will produce the same 
results as of CVSS v3 framework. However, for IoT nodes, the 
IoT related values of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡HI, 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟IoT and 
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦IoT computes the IoT specific outcome. 
VI. VULNERABILITY SECURITY ANALYSER (VSA) 
Vulnerability Security Analyser is an in-house designed 
and built tool to analyse risk for an IT system, which also 
suggests mitigation strategies. The tool works on the basis of 
attack graph theory where nodes represent IT assets under risk. 
Like any typical IT system, nodes are placed in layers. The 
edge nodes (interactive nodes) are easy to access and have 
public interaction, whereas the deeper layers are marked as 
inner layer nodes (Systems, Server and Data nodes). The inner 
nodes are hard to access and usually accessed via edge nodes. 
Vulnerability security analyser takes IT assets as inputs along 
with the probability of vulnerability between two given nodes, 
called link probability. The link probability is calculated using 
the fitness model of the graph network theory [17] as follows:  
,
2
)( kjkj
p
, xx + p + xx
 L   (2) 
where Lp is the link probability, xj is the probability of node j, 
xk is probability of node k, and p(xj,xk) is the fitness factor.  
Fitness factor is not the average, as average probability of two 
nodes may be misleading. Suppose that a node has a 
vulnerability score of 9 and the other node has a vulnerability 
of score 1. The average link probability of value 5 may 
misleads system administrators to delay their mitigation 
strategies. With the use of fitness factor as described in graph 
network theory [17], the average value will tilt towards the 
heavy weight node.  
 The VSA examines the link probability (Lp) of each node 
link and presents the risks in the form of node graph.  Based on 
the link vulnerabilities, it identifies the most critical node and 
the easiest path to it from the edge node. Thus, it helps security 
professionals to determine the weakest link of an 
organisation’s IT infrastructure under listed vulnerabilities. For 
a system administrator, to defend the system, the VSA tool 
helps to identify the starting point to minimise the possible 
impact. Once the critical paths are patched, the VSA tools will 
identify the next weakest link and hence forth. This helps the 
administrators to analyse the risk of the whole system instead 
of an individual server. It is recommended that administrators 
use their environmental knowledge along with the VSA tool.   
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Fig. 1.  Layers and nodes of selected supply chain system 
VII.  CASE STUDY  
In this section, we demonstrate the implementation of 
CVSSIoT on a supply chain system. In a supply chain system, 
temperature management is vital for maintaining temperature 
sensitive assets. Temperature loss can lead to food safety issues 
and therefore it can lower consumers’ satisfaction. It has been a 
challenge to maintain the temperature of cold assets throughout 
the supply chain process, particularly during loading, 
unloading, transportation and in display cabinet. It is estimated 
that 1.3 billion tons of food is wasted every year within the EU 
[16]. For our analysis, we assumed a realistic supply chain 
system as shown in Figure 1. The four layers depicted in 
Figure 1 are not the network topology layers but logical layers 
based on physical access and human interactions to the nodes.  
Data layer: Database, backup tapes and big data are in the 
top layer as it deals with organisational data and secrets. This 
layer is protected with multiple firewalls and is restrictive.  
Server layer: IT servers reside in this layer. Usually, the 
system admin and technical staff have access to these servers 
via terminals and specific tools. This layer is usually firewall 
protected. The data of this layer is stored in data layer. 
Systems layer: Typical IT solutions are configured on 
server layers, which communicate with data layer using servers 
layer. IT system admins have access via system admin tools. 
These system admin tools are also firewall protected.  
Interaction Layer: The end users access and interact with 
IT solutions using end terminal and devices. The devices in this 
layer are least restricted and rather considered easy to access 
and influence.  
               
                        Fig. 2a. VSA analysis of selected supply chain  using CVSS             Fig. 2b. VSA analysis of selected supply chain  using CVSSIoT 
Each item in Figure 1 represents a type of nodes. These 
nodes are assigned with real world vulnerabilities defined in 
NVD [18]. The CVSS base score indicates the probability of 
the vulnerability for each node. For example, the temperature 
sensors (Tem) in Figure 1 are assigned CVE-2017-6798 
vulnerability from VND. The Tem node is connected with 
various nodes in the system layer. The CVSS base score of 
CVE-2017-6798 is 7.8, and this is used as a node probability of 
the Tem node. Similarly, the probability of other connected 
node’s vulnerabilities is numerically represented with its CVSS 
score. The link probability between these nodes is calculated 
based on these scores. The values are placed in VSA (Section 
VI) to identify the critical nodes and the weakest paths to the 
target node.  
In our case study, the edge nodes are IoT devices, such as 
temperature sensors, GPS, mobile devices and smart CCTV 
cameras. Hence, vulnerability weights of all nodes are 
recalculated using CVSSIoT, following equation 1 in section V. 
Note that in CVSSIoT framework, equation 1 has no impact on 
the vulnerability score of non-IoT nodes. Our method only 
updates the score of IoT nodes. The updated values are listed in 
Table 2. 
TABLE2: REPORTED VULNERABILITY WEIGHTS 
Nodes CVSS v3 CVSSIoT NVD CVE-ID 
Temperature sensors 7.8 8.5 CVE-2017-6798 
GPS 7.5 7.5 CVE-2017-5239 
Android Mobile Devices 7.8 7.9 CVE-2017-0741 
Windows Mobile Devices 5.3 4.4 CVE-2017-13080 
Apple Mobile Devices 9.8 9.8 CVE-2017-13832 
Security CCTV cameras 6.1 8.2 CVE-2017-5367 
      The base vector of temperature sensor’s vulnerability 
CVE-2017-6798 under CVSS v3 is [AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S: 
U/C: H/I:H/A:H] and scored as 7.8. When this vulnerability is 
accessed under CVSSIoT, IoT specific values of AC:Li are 
selected and HI is assigned with value of Hi, as the 
temperature  sensor has direct impact on human safety. The 
base vector under CVSSIoT is updated as [AV:Li/AC:L/PR: 
N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/HI:Hi] and the computed value 
becomes 8.5, as shown in Table 2. The CVSSIoT base vectors 
of other IoT nodes are as below.   
CVE-2017-5239: [AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/HI:Ni] 
CVE-2017-0741: [AV:Li/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/HI:Ni] 
CVE-2017-13080: [AV:A/AC:Hi/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N/HI:Ni] 
CVE-2017-13080: [AV:A/AC:Hi/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N/HI:Ni] 
CVE-2017-13832: [AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/HI:Ni] 
CVE-2017-5367: [AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N/HI:Li] 
VIII. RESULTS 
The link probability between connected nodes of supply 
chain system is calculated as defined in Equation 2 in section 
VI. In our experiment xj and xk are the CVSS and CVSSIoT 
scores of NVD vulnerabilities assigned to node j and node k, 
respectively. These link probabilities (Lp) are passed to VSA 
tool. VSA tools analysed the security of whole system by 
identifying possible paths to a target node,  ranked them 
according to their severity and detected the most vulnerable 
node of this system.   
Figure 2 is the graphical representation of results produced 
by VSA tool. Figure 2a depicts the results when link 
probabilities are calculated using CVSS scores, and Figure 2b 
shows the results when the probabilities are calculated using 
CVSSIoT.  The light blue circles (for example, IDM) are middle 
layer and dark blue circles (for example, PaI, PaW) are edge 
nodes. An attacker’s target is to compromise the BD (Big Data) 
node. The arrows represent the possible path for an attacker to 
target node (BD). The shortest possible path to the BD is 
presented with dotted line. In Figure 2a, the VSA tool has 
highlighted the FT (File Transfer server, denoted by red circle) 
as the most critical node of the selected supply chain system. 
Compromising this node will make it rather easier for attacker 
to attack BD.  
As some of our nodes are IoT devices, in our next set of 
analysis we used the links probability calculated using CVSSIoT 
(Figure 2b) and feed it again to VSA tool. It has again 
identified the FT (File transfer server) as the most critical 
nodes. But link paths to BD including the easiest path are now 
updated and re-ranked, due to different probability calculation 
of IoT nodes. Following Figure 2a, there are eight possible 
paths to BD node and 6 out of 8 are via FT node. When link 
probabilities are calculated using CVSSIoT, it has re-ranked the 
attack possibilities for BD node as mentioned in Figure 2b. 
Under CVSSIoT, temperature sensor node (Tem) is ranked up 
and windows mobile devices (PaW) are moved down due to 
more realistic base vector values. So, the use of CVSS 
framework for a hybrid IT system (that is, mixed with 
traditional and IoT devices) may mislead system manager to 
develop inefficient mitigation strategies. The calculation based 
on proposed CVSSIoT provides much more realistic view of the 
hybrid IT system. 
      
Fig. 3. Graph theory analysis for selected supply chain mode 
The supply chain system is further analysed using graph 
theory to validate our results. We analysed the degree 
centrality, closeness centrality, and eigenvector centrality of 
supply chain system. We used the modified sigmoid functions 
[19] to calculate these values. To transform the calculated 
values ranging from 0 to 1, the vulnerability score of the nodes 
is assigned to constant k (used in sigmoid functions). First, the 
values of CVSS score are assigned to the constant. Then, same 
calculations are repeated using the CVSSIoT score as constant. 
CVSSIoT framework produces the same results in terms of 
above metrics as CVSS is for traditional nodes, but for IoT 
nodes it assigns more relative values as highlighted in Figure 3. 
The closeness centrality (which measures the sum of the length 
of shortest paths between nodes in a graph) and the eigenvector 
centrality (which measures heavy node connectivity to other 
highly connected nodes in a connected graph) have slightly 
high values under CVSSIoT for IoT nodes. In our selected 
supply chain model, temperature sensors (Tem), windows 
mobile devices (PaW) and security CCTV cameras (Sec) are 
IoT nodes and have higher values for closeness and 
eigenvector centrality when computed under CVSSIoT, 
compared to CVSS v3. The above results confirm the 
uniqueness of IoT nodes when compared with traditional 
nodes. Compared to CVSS framework, CVSSIoT produces 
more accurate results for IoT systems by exploiting unique 
characteristics of IoT nodes. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
.In this study, we proposed an extension to CVSS v3 
framework to better calculate the vulnerability probabilities for 
IoT embedded systems. The proposed CVSSIoT can be applied 
to all network topologies, that is, traditional, hybrid and/or IoT 
only systems. CVSSIoT is analysed using VSA tools and graph 
theory, and compared with CVSS v3 framework. The obtained 
results confirms that CVSSIoT assigns more realistic 
vulnerability score to IoT nodes by considering the unique 
characteristic of IoT system. We plan to further expand our 
CVSSIoT analysis for more complex topologies and design an 
evolving vulnerability modelling for the identification of 
potential threats in hybrid IT systems. 
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